We study the implications of forging stronger political ties with the US on the sensitivities of stock returns around the world to a global common factor - the global financial cycle. Using voting patterns at the United Nations as a measure of political ties with the US along with various...

We study the implications of forging stronger political ties with the US on the sensitivities of stock returns around the world to a global common factor - the global financial cycle. Using voting patterns at the United Nations as a measure of political ties with the US along with various...

We investigate how shareholder-and-debtholder conflicts of interest affect corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. We find that appointing affiliated banker directors, but not unaffiliated banker directors,...

We investigate how shareholder-and-debtholder conflicts of interests affect the corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. We find that the appointment of affiliated banker directors, but not unaffiliated banker...

This paper shows that local banking market conditions affect mortality rates in the United States. Exploiting the staggered relaxation of branching restrictions in the 1990s across states, we find that banking deregulation decreases local mortality rates. This effect is driven by a decrease in...

Using lenders becoming members of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as a plausible exogeneous shock, we examine whether and how lenders' commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures affects borrower firms' environmental performance. We find that client firms...

Using lenders becoming members of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as a plausible exogeneous shock, we examine whether and how lenders' commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures affects borrower firms' environmental performance. We find that client firms...